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Abstract 
Foreign investment in Ethiopia’s forestry sector is currently limited, but agricultural investments 
that affect forests — largely through forest clearing — are commonplace. We describe the nature 
of forest investments and outline the challenges and opportunities associated with implementing 
them. Given the key role forests play in rural livelihoods, new tenure arrangements will have 
significant implications for communities located at the forest–farm interface. We use evidence 
from a case study in the Arsi Forest area of Oromia Regional State to examine historic and 
contemporary forest benefit distributions and investigate the potential for conflict over competing 
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1. Introduction  
The Ethiopian government has expressed renewed interest in attracting foreign investment to the nation’s 
forestry sector through its Forest Development, Conservation and Utilization Proclamation (Proclamation 
No. 542/2007). However, limited capacity to manage administrative and regulatory elements of foreign 
investments, pervasive tenure uncertainty and rural livelihood insecurity all point to the need for caution as 
the government proceeds with land deals involving forests. This paper aims to clarify discussions relating to 
foreign investment in Ethiopia’s forests by describing the nature of these investments and outlining the 
challenges and opportunities associated with implementing them. First, we describe issues relevant to 
foreign investment in forests throughout Ethiopia. Second, we outline characteristics of households at the 
farm–forest interface who are likely to be directly affected by new investments. Third, we use evidence 
from a case study of a highland community located at a forest–farm interface to highlight competing forest 
access claims in a specific context and outline recommendations for addressing them.  
 
Recent publications on agricultural land grabbing (e.g. Cotula et al 2009; Rice 2009; Daniel&Mittal 2010) 
have raised the visibility of concerns over equity and social justice issues associated with contemporary 
foreign investments in natural resources in the global south. Ethiopia’s economy is firmly grounded in the 
agricultural sector, with about 83% of the population engaged in agricultural livelihoods. The government’s 
formal economic development approach — Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation (ADLI) — 
highlights the central position of agriculture in economic planning and prioritisation and heightening the 
significance of investments in the country’s productive land base. 
  
Foreign investments in the forestry sector are distinct from agricultural investments that affect forests. The 
latter include forest clearing for farm establishments, a practice with a decades-long history driven by a 
range of government policies affecting land use, resettlement and investment incentives. Forest clearing 
for agricultural establishment is a common practice in both highland and lowland regions. In most 
contemporary cases, forests are cleared using fire, leaving forest products largely unexploited (see, for 
example, the case of Bale Mountain described by Teshome et al 2010). Clearing dryland deciduous 
woodlands for cash crops (mainly sesame, sugarcane and cotton) occurs often in lowland areas due to: 
  highland agriculturalists resettling in traditionally pastoral areas (Lemenih et al 2007); 
  a climate of loosely regulated natural resource exploitation and weak government influence in remote 
areas (Government Scientist, pers. comm. 8 December 2010, Addis Ababa). 
Forest encroachment for agricultural expansion (including tea and coffee cultivation) by both large-scale 
investors and rural people generally leads to contemporary highland forest clearing (Reusing 2000; TAM 
Agribusiness 2004). Forest clearing is also affected by external markets and government policies. 
 
2. Methodology 
Case study evidence is based on field research conducted in Ethiopia in September 2009–May 2010 and 
December 2010 in a community and an adjacent natural forest area managed by a government operated 
Forest Enterprise (referred to subsequently as the Enterprise). Data include open-ended interviews with 
purposively selected experts and community members, a household livelihoods survey, forest plot 
measurements, ethnographic field notes and secondary sources. The household livelihoods survey uses a 
stratified random sampling design and is based upon the USAID Famine Early Warning System’s livelihood 
profile system (USAID 2008), modified to include non-marketed extracted forest resources. The household 
wealth ranking and historical timeline group interview is adapted from Laderchi (2005).  
 
The forest area studied covers about 1,220 hectares, classified as upper wet broad-leaved Afro-montane 
rainforest. It is part of a larger natural forest and plantation complex known as the Arsi Forest, which 
extends over 21,513 hectares, about 28% of which is plantation forest (see Figure 1). Natural forests persist 
largely in steeply sloped, difficult to access areas, while flatter areas have been converted to farmland 
(Poulsen 1973). The forest and surrounding villages transition between two agro-ecological zones: 
  the Weina Dega or Baddaa Dareetti (temperate, cool sub-humid highlands), at 1,500–2,300m elevation 
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  the Dega or Badaa (cool and humid highlands) at 2,300
Muslim Oromo agro-pastoralists have inhabited the area for over 100 years. Prima
potatoes and to a lesser extent, wheat.
Figure 1: Study site 
In the study, we: 
1 . investigated how historic and contemporary land use and forest benefit distributions have changed
2. investigated how land relations inform current resource rights in a community living on the forest
interface 
3. explored the ecological, socio-economic and institutional challenges 
that would likely accompany foreign investment.
 
3. Background: Processes driving forest investment in Ethiopia
Researchers often identify land and water scarcity 
Rice 2009; Deininger et al 2011). Zoomers (2010) emphasises 
demand for non-food crops (especially biofuels), conservation, tourism and land purchase
Diaspora. In Ethiopia, investment trends affecting forests reflect historical relations between government, 
elites and international institutions 
3.1 Narratives of under'exploitation and over
Ethiopian forestlands have long been characteri
development or as over-exploited areas in ne
decades, calls for increased foreign investment in agricultural practices that involve forest clearing (under
exploitation) have paralleled clearly articulated plans to halt deforestation and land deg
exploitation), creating conflicting policy recommendations
Unit for Ethiopia (UNEUE) field officer commenting on strategies for incentivising agricultural investment by 
Ethiopian citizens returning after the fall of the Derg regime said:
Land allocations for investment purposes is ongoing but government authorities need to be encouraged to 
move investors to hinterland areas and allocate the land located near the villages to returnees. This may requi
compensation to investors for clearing and infra
3 
–3,200m elevation (Aalbaek&Kide 1993).
 
Adapted from: Wondo Genet GIS Department 2008
of the new tenure arrangements 
 
as driving foreign investment in the global 
other processes, including
for control of natural resource benefits. 
'exploitation 
sed as under-exploited areas in need of economic 
ed of conservation-oriented management. 
. For example, a United Nations Emergencies 
  
structure facility development. 
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Source:  Shank 1994:2 
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Meanwhile, the Ethiopian National Action Programme to Combat Desertification, drafted in conjunction 
with a separate United Nations body, the Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) said: 
The policy provisions contained in this draft … encourage the development of forests by individuals, 
organizations and government and the designation of protected forests and productive forests to be 
administered in accordance with laws to be enacted for each. The draft stresses the need to give security of 
ownership of forest products to the developer and the importance of protecting every kind of forest from 
natural and man-made destruction. 
Source: FDRE 1998:62 
Poor integration between forest conservation and market liberalisation confound efforts to develop 
transparent and equitable strategies for natural resource-based economic development. They also mirror 
patterns identified in relationships between the state and private enterprise in peripheral resource-rich 
areas throughout the world that have led to forest benefit divestment from rural people to outside elites 
(Scott 1998; Rudel 2007; Lunstrum 2009; Scott 2009). Cursory references to laws governing rights and 
restrictions over forest use (e.g. FDRE 1998:62) are enough to propel processes forward, so forest benefits 
can be extracted before specific rights, restrictions and responsibilities are articulated. Multi-decadal 
planning timelines often characterise forest management endeavours, compounding the challenges of 
ensuring investors abide by social and ecological protections. 
 
Transparent forest management is further hampered by unclear institutional authority and communication 
between agencies. For example, foreign investors work primarily with the Ethiopian Investment Authority 
to establish business operations, while government forestry specialists work in the Forestry Research 
Centre, a subdivision of the Ministry of Agriculture. Government currently marginalises forestry, as 
evidenced by budget allocations of about 6 million Ethiopian Birr (£226,110) in 2010 to the Forestry 
Research Centre, compared to 90 million Ethiopian Birr (£3,391,792) allocated to the more politically 
important agriculture, with closely monitored annual crop production figures. High production is associated 
with political success, compelling officials to use any means at their disposal to favour agricultural output, 
sometimes at the expense of other land uses like forestry or livestock grazing. 
 
A different government office — the Environmental Protection Authority — approves and manages 
forestry-based emissions reduction programmes and jurisdictional separations make it difficult to identify 
and monitor investments affecting forests. While forest investors must submit a Forest Management Plan 
to the Ministry of Agriculture with their application, only those forestry projects require such approvals. 
Forestry officials seldom review agricultural projects involving forest clearing. Granting financial benefits to 
those agencies that succeed in attracting foreign investors further hampers cross-agency integration. 
Regional actors have an incentive to attract and retain foreign investors to their districts because it allows 
them to compete more effectively for scarce regional development funds for infrastructure improvements 
that bring status and additional economic development opportunities (Government Official, pers. comm. 18 
May 2010, Addis Ababa). Several financially unattractive aspects of forest sector investment in Ethiopia 
exist, but foreign investors have more secure rights than domestic investors, so they have a comparative 
advantage. Domestic investors are unwilling to invest in forest resources because of: 
… length of time for return on investment, insecure land tenure, disputes with local people, problems in the 
courts because judges and police are subject to bribes. [Foreign investors are less vulnerable to these problems 
because] their interests are more visible … 
Source: Scientist, pers. comm. 20 May 2010, Addis Ababa 
Despite additional protections, investment has been sluggish. 
3.2 Forest investment challenges and opportunities 
Formally recognised private foreign investment in Ethiopia’s forests — including afforestation, reforestation 
and non-timber forest-product market development — is currently limited. Only one of the handful of 
foreigners who enquired about investment opportunities in the past few years is moving forward — 
developing a business plan and securing appropriate permissions (Government Official, pers. comm. 18 
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May 2010). Foreign investors commonly raise concerns about feasibility, human resources, security of long-
term lease arrangements and perceptions of political. The lack of investment rooted in ecological, socio-
economic and institutional challenges (see Table 1) combine to create a climate of uncertainty around 
forest investment that favours illegal conversion of forested lands to agriculture by government actors, 
large-scale investors and rural people, threatening the livelihoods of households living at the forest–farm 
interface and limiting future afforestation and reforestation possibilities. In addition, investment challenges 
common to most forestry ventures, include delayed and intermittent benefit flows, large capital outlays 
and dependence on fluctuating markets (Bliss&Kelly 2008). 
Table 1: Challenges to forest management and investment in Ethiopia 
Ecological Socio-economic Institutional 
• Lack of knowledge 
• Likely high expense of propagating 
and establishing native trees 
• Lack of clear guidelines for native vs. 
exotic replanting obligations 
• Increased pressures on forest from 
land degradation, shrinking farm size 
and reduced grazing land  
• Forest fragmentation 
• Unclear tenure arrangements and 
boundaries 
• Limited economic diversification 
• Limited funds for forest management 
• Human resettlement driving land 
conversion and new land use 
practices  
• Ethnic tension 
• Currency inflation 
• Competing jurisdictional 
authority over activities affecting 
forests 
• Weak enforcement capacity 
• Political inferiority of forestry to 
agriculture 
• Inexperience in enforcing 
reforestation regulations 
• Unclear reporting requirements 
 
Some scientists see increased investment in Ethiopian forestlands as a way to alleviate rural poverty and 
enhance forest ecosystem protection and function (Bongers&Tennigkeit 2010). The high demand for wood 
products in Ethiopia and neighbouring East African countries may justify increased investment in the 
forestry sector (Bekele-Tesemma 2007), but the above conditions have stifled investor confidence. 
 
The Forest Development, Conservation and Utilization Proclamation encourages private investment in 
natural forests, with incentives such as tax abatement and low-cost long-term land concessions. A more 
detailed implementation plan intended to guide investors may be published in 2011 (Government Official, 
pers. comm. 18 May 2010, Addis Ababa). Investors may harvest and process remaining timber, import 
processing equipment tax-free, and establish timber plantations using exotic or native species at their 
discretion (Forest investor, pers. comm. 10 April 2010, Addis Ababa). Local, regional and national 
government entities and investors negotiate specific lease agreements. 
 
While the challenges weigh heavily in some foreign investors' decision-making processes, others may not 
enter into typical cost-benefit analyses. Project impacts least likely to be understood or acknowledged by 
investors pertain to the rights of rural residents and invoking under-exploitation and overexploitation 
narratives to describe forest utilisation legitimises foreign entry into these markets. Evidence from the 
agricultural sector underscores three additional concerns about the broad affects of foreign investor 
presence on forests and forest-dependent communities:  
1 . Aside from low-skilled and low-waged jobs, foreign investment may have no direct benefits for the 
rural poor and may leave the poorest more vulnerable (Melesea&Helmsing 2010). A recent global 
survey of conservation program impact on poverty found timber harvest rarely benefits the poor, 
and non-timber forest-product programs do not significantly reduce poverty (Leisher et al 2010). 
2. Forced human resettlement remains an issue of concern (Hammond 2008), affecting relationships 
between people in communities, land use practices and socio-political mobilisation. 
3. Large-scale investors entering a sector do not necessarily improve domestic markets for agricultural 
inputs, outputs and financial services (probably the most important limiting factors to smallholder 
income growth) (Hazell et al 2010). 
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Economists, development agencies and governments associate increased foreign investment with 
economic development and poverty alleviation (Haile&Assefa 2006). However, the rationale that it will 
'contribute significantly to development through the injection of capital, technology, management know-
how and market access'  (UNCTAD 2000) may not hold true for most rural people, particularly give 
constraints on free expression and market access (HRW 2010). 
 
4. Communities at the forest–farm interface 
The forest–farm interface is the locus of investment attention in highland forests. This area is home to rural 
households with unique livelihood characteristics and benefit claims to forest resources that distinguish 
them from other agricultural households. Ecological, social and economic change characterise the forest–
farm interface, defined here as zones in or near forests occupied by smallholder farmers. The interface is 
historically remote from markets and typically difficult to access (Fisher&Hirsch 2008) and often includes 
ambiguous lands, lands cultivated by people who have no official use rights (Sato 2000), and legally 
cultivated lands. Households in Ethiopia’s forest–farm interface tend to be highly dependent upon forest 
resources for fuelwood, livestock grazing and building materials (Mamo et al 2007; Yemiru et al 2010) and 
are at greatest risk of livelihood loss resulting from foreign investment in highland forests. 
 
Only about 0.2% of remaining highland forests are undisturbed forests (Reusing 1998). In the late-1980s, 
government established National Forest Priority Areas (NFPAs) (Cheng et al 1989) to gain control over most 
remaining natural forest stands, most of which are in remote parts of the Gambella and Oromia regional 
states (Reusing 2000). Government manages natural forests through a system of 58 NFPAs, thirteen of 
which are under integrated forest management systems involving local communities. While most remaining 
forestlands are in NFPAs, less than 10% of state forest boundaries are officially mapped (World Bank 2010) 
and boundary demarcation can be fraught with conflict.   
 
The Forestry Research Centre (FRC) will steer investors towards ‘abandoned lands’ and places ‘where 
forests are being cleared or encroached’ (Government Official, pers. comm., 18 May 2010). Government's 
rationale for seizing forestland is questionable as pastoral livelihoods (widespread seasonal grazing and 
shifting cultivation) dominate the lowland (Cotula et al 2009; Vermeulen&Cotula 2010). Diffuse lowland 
infrastructure and institutional influence exist in contrast to more concentrated highland settlement and 
strong political networks, where dispossession processes centre on claims that people are encroaching. 
Uncertain forest boundaries and infusion of western conservation values create political space for 
government to remove encroaching farmers and open land for alternative uses. 
 
Land privatisation causes much dispute in Ethiopia (Crewett&Korf 2008; Ali et al 2011). Government owns 
all forest and agricultural land, granting usufruct rights to citizens on farmland, and maintaining 
management authority in forestlands. Farmland cannot be bought or sold, but use rights can be transferred 
within families and people can lease their farmland for limited periods. Modern farmland distribution 
results from complex circumstances including tradition, allocation by the socialist Derg between 1974 and 
1991, and local Peasant Association decisions (Kebede 2002). Leading up to the May 2010 elections, 
contentious debates characterised land privatisation either as the path to productivity and efficiency or as a 
neoliberal conspiracy aimed at depriving rural people of land rights (Kidan 2010).  
 
Econometric studies in Ethiopia provided no definitive evidence that tenure issues notably affect people’s 
land use decisions, or that most people consider their tenure status insecure (Benin et al 2005; Deininger& 
Jin 2006; Crewett&Korf 2008). Those in favour of enacting policies to ensure more secure and transferable 
land rights tend to argue that it will increase farmers' long-term investments in their land (Ali et al 2011), 
but do not examine potentially harmful implications of formalising land transfer rights for marginalised 
people. In the case of forests, local actors and the state have negotiated access rights in processes that 
have unfolded over decades. According to Peters (2009: 1322), such land relations are ‘open to 
interpretation' and ‘careful attention has to be paid to the specific meanings and constructions, including 
narratives and stories placed by different social actors on the principles justifying access, use, and control’. 
This sentiment is central to concerns about the impact of foreign investment in forestry on landholders.  
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4.1 Historic land use change 
According to community elders, forests in the area under study extended 17
Negele and about 20km south to the town of Kofele as recently at 70 years ago. 
pastures and chafas (wetlands) used as seasonal grazing areas
cropping comprise the only remaining 
 
Italian and Ethiopian sawmill operators 
1974), who also granted concessions
included mandatory replanting obligations, but 
neglected to follow them (Poulsen 197
Ethiopian–Swedish development programme 
An area of forest roughly estimated at 100,000ha seemed to be disintegrating annually and the almost total 
elimination of all real forest from the country seemed probable within 30 years at the most. Against this 
background, the urgent forestry needs within the Project area seemed to be:
°  Protection and rational utilization of the remaining forests. 
°  Increased reafforestation of erosion
°  Improved wood utilization. 
Invoking under- and over-utilisation narratives
anthropogenic destruction and greater efficiency and productivity in forest use. 
the Derg granted every household a small farm 
a dramatic conversion of natural forests to farmland occurred in the study are
the Enterprise undertook more organis
government  to convert of 87% of the natural forest to plantation forest 
13% was to be restored and conserv
 
Swedish consultants developed a forest management plan dividing the natural forest into management 
units or blocks and established ‘working circles’ based on forest cover, slope and access (see 
1990, the project produced over 2 million seedlings, targeting about 2,000 ha annually for replanting. 
Insufficient revenue to execute the plan led to overharvesting standing native timber to make up for 
account deficits and plantation development eventually halted. The 
plantation in the Arsi Forest by the 1980s, but realised none of the planned natural forest improvements. 
While they provided part of the original rationale for forestry engagement in the area, restoration and 
conservation objectives were not implemented, which shows how conservation language (narratives of 
over-exploitation) are used to legitimise resource dispossession.
Figure 2:  Land use change in 141,976h
Notes: 1. Land cover estimates of 'bush, bamboo thicket, woodland
1990 figures are unknown 2
3 
in the case study 
km west to the town of Arsi 
Highland bamboo thickets, 
 punctuated forest areas
community grazing lands.  
heavily exploited the forest in the reign of Haile Selassie (1930
 to military officials, religious institutions and patrons. Concessions 
as these regulations were not enforced
3). The Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU), a joint 
established in the late 1960s, outlined their mandate:
  
 
-prone slopes and other areas available for planting.
, the programme calls for heightened protection from 
From 1976 to 1988, 
(usually about two hectares, depending on household size
a (see 
ed timber harvesting, with technical assistance from the Swedish 
and generate 
ed (MoA 1990). 
project established over 15,000ha of 
 
a forest area, 1976–2011 
' are carried backwards from 1990 figures as placeholders; actual pre
. The area includes the study site and land under the jurisdiction of different Kebeles.
Sources: 





Source: Poulsen 1970:3 
when 
), 
Figure 2). At the time, 
state revenue, while 
Table 2). In 
-
 
MoA 1990; Didha 2008 
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7 6455 0 0 0 0 0 0 6455 
8 5455 0 344 374 548 0 0 6722 
9 6138 0 0 337 374 0 0 6849 
10 4073 0 788 366 1125 0 0 6352 
11 7339 0 0 0 0 0 0 7339 
Adapted from: MoA 1990  
Plantation harvests accelerated into the 2000s as seedlings planted in the 1970s have matured, leading to 
significant revenue generation. The programme's success led to government establishing more Enterprises 
in other parts of the Oromia Regional State, effectively expanding state revenue generation (see Table 3). 
The Enterprise contributes to a range of community development projects, for example: 
  building schools and clinics in Kebeles bordering plantation and natural forests; 
  disbursing Eucalyptus seedlings to try to boost farm incomes; 
  providing supplementary agricultural extension services; and 
  exploring options to devolve some natural forest management authority to communities. 
Still, most plantation and natural forest revenues generated bypass the communities that live near them. 
Table 3: Extent (ha) and value (£) of forest enterprise landholdings, 2010 
Name of 
enterprise  
Concession area (ha) 
Estimated value (£) 
Plantation forest  Natural forest Bare land  Total  
Arsi 15,162 186,690 32,800 234,652 26,269,000 
Bale 3,483 248,536 185,089 437,108 26,957,700 
Borena-Guji 6,389 97,215 106,175 209,779 18,287,680 
Addis Ababa 22,036 16,694 4,174 42,904 7,981,870 
Hararge 4,958 10,278 21,183 36,419 6,464,500 
Ilubabor 4,446 359,862 6,936 371,244 38,993,800 
Jimma 8,948 181,792 36,525 227,265 34,212,670 
Wallaga 10,405 100,527 75,436 186,368 15,403,750 
Total 75,827 1,201,594 468,318 1,745,738 174,570,970 
Adapted from: Oromia Forest Enterprise 2010 
Forest regulations and enforcement 
Current access claims and selective regulatory enforcement have an historical basis; discrepancies between 
ownership claims on paper and in practice can be traced back to the early days of Amhara rule in the 
region. Inconsistent enforcement also seems to have a long history, positioning regulations as secondary to 
ongoing processes of negotiation over forest access in the context of changing social relations. 
 
Following conquest of the Arsi area at the end of the 19th century, forests became state property (see 
Table 4). The emperor granted land concessions, with accompanying rights to local labour, mainly to 
Amhara military officials, widows and other outside elites (Poulsen 1973). While the army and police were 
summoned on numerous occasions (as recently as spring 2010) to enforce access restrictions, benefit 
distributions represent a chain of less contentious interactions between the state, outside elites and local 
people. Specific regulations governing forest access have remained relatively uniform (see Table 4), though 
enforcement has varied dramatically over time, and access claims are ill-defined. While few questioned the 
state’s right to levy taxes, people resisted further steps to establish a formal presence in the area and exert 
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additional controls over resources. During initial government efforts to establish plantations in the 1970s, 
locals uprooted or livestock trampled seedlings, so armed military guarded plantations until local people 
eventually accepted them. These tightly enforced regulations contrast with the current government's loose 
enforcement. In hindsight, Community Elders (pers. comm. 18 December 2009) viewed tight Derg 
enforcement of forest access restrictions positively. In a timeline exercise conducted with community 
elders, interviewees described the early days of the Derg as a time of abundance: 
At that time people were afraid and the Enterprise was keeping the forest well. Many people used the forest for 
production of honey and the people said ‘the forest is our shade’ so it should not be touched. 
 
… the forests were full and wide and every species was present. We used the forest for farming equipment and 
grasses … all people were keeping the forests, even elders and youth.  
These quotes reveal that actors actively used forests in ways that did not, in their perception, conflict with 
a climate of rigid enforcement and that they saw themselves as forest managers and stewards. In the 
context of diminishing natural forests (see Figure 2), memories of abundance in the late 1970s were likely 
strongly shaped by higher forest cover and lower human population densities at the time. 
Table 4: Forest regulations and governing bodies in Arsi Forest, 1930-present 
Regime Forest regulations Arsi Forest governing 
institution 
Haile Selassie  
1930–1974 
Emperor owns all forestlands and government sets 
hunting days. Permission needed for grazing, wood 
collection and other activities. Concessions granted at 
Emperor’s discretion. 
Imperial Court 
The Derg  
1974–1991 
State owns all forestlands. Written permission needed to 
hunt, settle, fell trees, collect, load or transport any forest 
product, graze cattle and remove resources from the 
forest,  except taking fallen branches, leaves, bark, setting 
beehives or harvesting honey.   
Munessa-Shashemene 
Integrated State Forest 
Development and Utilization 
Project, the Chilalo Agricultural 
Development Unit (CADU) 
Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary 
Democratic Front  
1992–present 
Forest development encouraged. Permission required to 
cut trees, settle temporarily or permanently, graze 
domestic animals, hunt, carry cutting saws and tools used 
for cutting trees or extracting honey. 
Arsi Forest Enterprise 
Source: Poulsen 1973:10–11.  
Compared to natural forests, plantations are considered well guarded today. Except for limited grazing and 
periodic access to slash from plantation thinning, plantation production feeds urban — not local — 
markets. In natural forests, community consumption of forest products is largely unregulated: even when 
higher order offenses such as timber harvesting sometimes receive local police attention, they rarely result 
in convictions. Corruption, insufficient labour force, low commitment, authority and politicking undermine 
efforts to protect natural forest. Subjective regulatory enforcement contributes to a sense that forest 
access is politically and socially negotiable. Changing values and policies also shape perceptions of resource 
rights. When asked about selective harvesting by local people of one species (Podocarpus falcatus) for 
fuelwood, a guard explained that the Derg wanted to eradicate large indigenous trees to convert natural 
forest to plantation. People were informally permitted to cut large indigenous species and over time came 
to see it as a right (Forest Guard, pers. comm. 18 March 2010).   
 
Enforcing forest regulations involves a range of actors with different levels of authority (see Figure 3). Local 
forest experts identified challenges to effective enforcement at different levels of government, emphasising 
inattention to forest regulatory enforcement. Forest protection is a common rallying point in political 
speeches and community events, but rarely leads to substantive action. Forest guards expressed frustration 
at government's weak enforcement: 
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Officials are afraid to enforce regulations because they don’t want to harm their standing in the community 
their chances of re-election. 
Enforcement is political and tension
forest conservation while also working to maintain their identity as egalitarian men of the people.
Enforcement patterns reflect broader trends in forest management; the stat
with forest exploitation before specific rights and responsibilities are detailed, and the difference between 
paper regulations and practice shows forest access 
Figure 3: Government entities involved in 
Forest benefit distributions from the 1880s to the present
The benefits, beneficiaries and effects of forest exploitation i
Beneficiary categories include the state, outsid
of individuals who are heterogeneous and hold a range of entitlements and capabilities
framing provides a coarse-grained lens 
Table 5: Selected benefits, beneficiaries and effects, 1880s
Decade(s) Benefit 
1880s–1930s Forest requisition 
1940s–1960s Able to grant land & labour to elites
1940s–1970s Post-harvest replanting 
requirements not enforced 
1970s–2010 Able to collect fuelwood, timber, 
graze livestock and hunt (irregularly
granted) 
1980s Able to harvest native timber and 
convert forest to plantation 
1990s–2010 Forest converted to farmland
 
Source: Forest Guard, per
s between rhetoric and action exist. Leaders routinely advocate for 
e is generally willing to proceed 
to be negotiable between actors over time.  
enforcing forest regulation, Arsi Forest
Source: Local forest experts, 17 May 2010, Arsi Forest
 
n the study site
e elites and local people, but these categories are comprised 
for assessing forest benefit allocations. 
–2010 
Beneficiary Other 
State Local people marginalis
 State  &outside elites Social tension; Locals marginalised
Outside elites Accelerated land conversion; changing 
forest composition
 
Local people Uncertainty over 
seedling regeneration inhibited; 
changing forest composition
State Accelerated land conversion; changing 
forest composition
 Local people Accelerated land conversion
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Reinvestments in forests have been limited to nonexistent, but the benefits include myriad ways that actors 
and institutions access forest resources, ranging from timber harvest to outright forest conversion for 
agricultural. Some benefits constrain other actors or institutions; some may serve as compensation for 
other lost benefits and most exact costs on forest resources. Foreign investment will likely greatly affect 
existing forest benefit distributions (see Table 6), although different actors will feel the effects differently, 
with locals exposed to direct livelihood impacts, such as restricted grazing and fuelwood collection. 
Figure 6: Effects of new tenures (e.g. foreign investment) on forest benefits, 1940–2011 





Timber harvest and sale; Able 
to grant land to patrons  
Wildlife hunting access; 
Medicinal plant harvest; 
Religious worship  
Receiving timber concession  
 
Benefit likely to 
change  
 
Receiving bribes; Able to 
grant access to locals 
 
Converting agricultural land; 
Collecting fuelwood; Harvesting 
building material; Grazing 
livestock 
Illegal timber harvest; Cheap 
fuelwood available 
 




revenues; Receiving hunting 
permit sales  
Access to beekeeping sites Plantation wood products 
available; Recreational 
wildlife hunting access 
Notes: 
*
Benefits of the past, less prevalent or non-existent today;
 
Negligible wildlife hunting persists among locals, but outside elites 
undertake trophy hunting (which generates state revenue) — likely to continue with foreign investment. 
 
Local people stand to lose substantial benefits under increased foreign investment scenarios. Compared to 
potential benefits associated with foreign investment like land lease payments, royalties, stumpage fees 
and other incomes, losses borne by the state are small and mainly consist of political power forfeited when 
ceasing to grant local people informal access to forest resources. Bribe payments will likely continue, 
possibly shifting from the courts and checkpoints to other recipients. Outside elites will accrue the benefits 
of available plantation wood and fuelwood sales, unaffected by new investments.  
 
5. Community forest benefits and potential conflict 
The forest area studied provides the state, outside elites and local people with a range of benefits. This 
section details how forest resources contribute to household livelihoods and explores the effects of 
changing forest tenure on local communities. We examine events surrounding a recent forest boundary 
demarcation exercise in the area and consider potential conflict that might accompany tenure changes. 
5.1 Household livelihoods and forests 
Data from a household livelihood survey highlights attributes of different wealth groups and their related 
forest benefits (see Table 7). Household attributes vary in terms of average land and livestock holdings, 
which affect crop production and the ability to withstand livelihood stress associated with drought, crop 
failure or currency devaluation. All wealth groups in the study area rely on forests to supplement their 
livelihoods. Households rely on forest products for livestock grazing land, homestead sites, fuelwood, 
building materials and other non-timber forest products, and generate (42% of mean) cash incomes by 
selling fuelwood. Fuelwood demand in the area is high, partly due to a thriving alcohol distillation industry 
in nearby Arsi Negele. Households with donkeys earn more from fuelwood sales as they are able to get 
higher prices closer to market, sell larger volumes of wood and reduce transportation costs. 
 
Other studies have found comparable forest incomes as a percentage of total household cash incomes, 
(e.g., Mamo et al (2007) found 39% in central Ethiopia; Babulo et al (2008) found 27% in northern Tigray; 
Yemiru et al (2010) found 34–53% in the Bale Mountains). Interviewees described a recent social shift in 
which the sale of fuelwood had become less stigmatised. While previously only widows and the very poor 
collected fuelwood for sale, it is now common among all wealth groups. Female-headed households and 
women earn their family's primary income are particularly dependent on fuelwood collection due to small 
landholdings, their inability to plough fields and a lack of alternative income sources. 
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Table 7: Household attributes by wealth ranking in study site, 2010 
Attributes by household 
Household wealth rank 
Weighted 





Mean age of head 42 34 49 47 44 
Female-headed 33% 0 0 0 2 
Mean household members 6.8 6.9 10.7 14.3 9.8 
Mean landholding size (ha) 0.3 0.7 1.1 1.7 1.0 
Mean tropical livestock units  0.93 1.54 5.04 8.85 4.3 
Household crop production as a % 
of minimum caloric requirements 
56% 72% 94% 108% 87% 
Mean staple food expenditures as 
a % of mean total income 
27% 24% 19% 12% 20% 
Mean fuelwood income as a % of 
mean cash income 
85% 65% 28% 37% 42% 
Mean number of donkeys 0.50 0.88 1.00 2.00 1.06 
5.2 Forest access change and conflict 
New restrictions on forest access will compromise the ability of households to meet their livelihood needs. 
Access restrictions can incite conflict between enforcers and communities. Disputes over a 2009–2010 
forest boundary demarcation provide grounds to explore these dynamics. 
 
Demarcation, or re-establishing forest boundaries by the state, reaffirms state claims to authority over 
forest benefit distributions; establishing homesteads creates a permanent claim by households over forest 
resources. Conflicts with local communities over homestead and farm encroachment have arisen at every 
demarcation in the last four decades. The state has responded by reducing the size of the natural forest by 
varying degrees to accommodate new farms. Due to a combination of cumulative forest loss, emerging 
values and revenue streams associated with ecotourism, conservation and ecosystem service payments, 
officials are now less likely to consent to new homestead claims. In 2009, they demolished homesteads 
built in forest areas since the previous demarcation in 1999 and replanted forest. The demarcation process 
involves assessing forest boundary markers and verifying land use at established points. After an initial visit, 
a second visit is scheduled to confirm boundaries, collect additional data and hold meetings. Enterprise 
workers later demolish houses in the presence of Ethiopian military (Figures 4 and 5).  
Figure 4: Demolished homestead 
Photo taken immediately after a homestead was demolished. 
Household possessions are bundled in the foreground and roofing, 
fencing and other building materials are piled in the mid-ground. A 





Figure 5: Forest guard marks official natural 
forest boundary 
Following discussions, a forest guard marks a remnant Croton 
macrostachyus tree in the midst of crops to demarcate the official natural 
forest boundary 
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A demarcation exercise conducted by the Enterprise, local government authorities and Ethiopian military 
from winter 2009 to spring 2010 revealed that 54 households (8% of all households in the community) had 
expanded their farms or established new homesteads (ranging in size from 0.25 to 11.25 hectares) inside 
the natural forest area under study. In March 2010, demarcation activities resulted in violent conflict in a 
community adjacent to the case under study. Five managerial staff, 43 guards and day labourers, and six 
military members arrived at a site to prepare already cleared areas for tree planting. About 2,000 members 
of the local Kebele descended on Enterprise employees with sticks, rocks and traditional spears, leaving the 
military untouched. One man was hospitalized and many sustained broken bones, cuts and other injuries. 
Planting activities were halted and a series of community meetings followed. 
 
The community, Enterprise and government authorities are still negotiating, but government identified 
alternative communal grazing land in a different part of the Kebele where households without landholding 
could relocate. However, this decision had complex economic and social implications for local communities. 
Eight months later, in December 2010, most households had returned to the superior soil conditions on 
forest plots for cropping. When asked about the government's decision-making process, an elder (pers. 
Comm. 20 April 2010) responded: 
Why do you ask this question? We do not agree. The government is powerful; we are afraid. We have attended 
many meetings and separated without resolution. Our alternative is to educate our children for government 
work. 
Access claims described previously in the case emphasise negotiation between actors, but local people 
have little recourse when higher-level authorities are determined to enforce restrictions. Peasant-state 
relations are characterised by ‘political marginalisation, heavy state intervention and highly extractive 
relations between state and peasants’ (Milas&Latif 2000:363). The community repeatedly asserted that 
resettlement on community grazing land was unacceptable because the land was the future site of a 
mosque and school, representing an unsuccessful appeal to officials’ higher religious and familial values. 
The focus of violence on Enterprise employees while community members assiduously avoided harming 
military personnel exposes the limits of dissent. In effect, households were saying to Enterprise workers 
(mostly neighbours living under shared circumstances): How can you deny us our basic subsistence rights? 
 
Aside from other challenges had people attacked soldiers, their moral claims would not have resonated 
with the same force. The limits to protest may be even more strongly felt as foreign investors enter 
contested spaces. As foreign investors receive preferential protections and economic interests supersede 
historically negotiated value-based claims, local claims to forest resources may be further marginalised. 
 
Peluso&Ribot (2003: 163) point out that ‘states often manage people as subjects to whom privileges, rather 
than rights, are to be delegated’. Household-level forest benefit claims are rooted in customary and 
historical access to forest resources; locals weave rights together with understandings of what constitutes 
legitimate use. New revenue-generating opportunities in forest areas increasingly threaten such claims. 
Since rights are not formally devolved, informal forest benefit distributions are not guaranteed, leaving 
local people disadvantaged as they attempt to assert access claims.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The case reveals two broad areas of concern regarding increased foreign investment in forests:  
  Little scrutiny of widespread forest clearing for agriculture likely to significantly impact on local 
livelihoods, forests and potential future engagement in forest-based activities. 
  Locals less able to make livelihood claims in the face of new tenures that draw legitimacy from the 
market, rather than local values. 
Current foreign investment in forestry and the resultant impacts are small, but alongside agricultural 
investment impacts and potential future investments in forest-based emission reduction programmes (e.g. 
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the Clean Development Mechanism and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation), 
potential effects on household livelihoods are tremendous. The ‘foreignisation of space’ (Zoomers 
2010:433) holds few certain benefits for rural people. Narratives of under- and over-exploitation that 
legitimise domestic and foreign interventions in rural livelihoods have veiled contradictory policies and 
facilitated forest benefit transfers to the state and outside elites. 
 
Foreign investment in highland forests will affect rural livelihoods, due to the interconnectedness of forest 
and agricultural incomes at the forest–farm interface. As noted in studies on the devolution of forest 
management from the state to rural people, calls for democratic institution-building can be problematic 
when institutional climates do not hold ‘inclusion and equity as goals’ (Becker 2001:506). Competition 
between elite actors over resources stifles cooperation and transparent policy-making to govern land 
tenure and investment (Gatzweiler 2007). Therefore, institutions capable of and interested in protecting 
rural livelihoods and access claims will likely not materialise without significant pressure from individuals 
and organisations with the power to leverage change. 
 
As access claims are socio-political, not formal, formal processes are needed to establish and enforce 
livelihood claims and articulate workable tenure arrangements at community level. Such formal processes 
should institute more transparent application, approval and monitoring protocols for all land investments 
affecting forests. As resources become more limited and new markets evolve to generate revenues from 
them, rural livelihood claims tend to be evaluated in terms of emerging value systems, not the systems in 
which claims evolved. The narratives and histories that shaped access claims must be documented so that 
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